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Abstract
We investigate mechanism design without pay-
ments when agents have different types of prefer-
ences. Contrary to most settings in the literature
where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the
facility location games all agents would like to stay
close to (or away from) the facility, we demon-
strate the limitation of mechanism design without
payments when agents have different preferences
by introducing exchanging phases. We consider
two types of exchanging phases. The first model is
called central exchanges where the exchanges are
performed by a central authority. The other model
is called individual exchanges where agents ex-
change their outcomes by themselves. By using fa-
cility location games as an example, we provide a
truthful mechanism that optimizes social welfare
in central exchanges. We also provide a univer-
sally truthful randomized mechanism that achieves
at least a half of the optimal social welfare in indi-
vidual exchanges.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design aims to achieve desirable social outcomes
when the partial but necessary information are possessed by
selfish agents. To resolve this problem, truthful mechanisms
are designed to provide selfish agents incentives for declar-
ing their true private information. Incentives are usually in-
jected by the payments in those mechanisms such as auc-
tions. Recently, mechanism design without payments was pro-
posed in [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009]. They showed
that, when the domain of agents’ preferences is highly struc-
tured, it is possible to design truthful mechanisms without
resorting to payments and achieve (approximately) good out-
comes at the same time. Since then, the framework of mecha-
nism design without payments has been successfully applied
to different applications, such as voting, facility locations and
machine scheduling. In this paper, we show a limitation of the
framework of mechanism design without payments in some
settings, especially where agents have different preferences.
As there is no payment, after social outcomes (or allocations
for agents) being chosen by mechanisms, selfish agents could
exchange their allocations with others to their mutual bene-
fits. As mechanism designers, we should care about the final
social outcomes, resulting from these exchanging phases. In
this paper, we call this problem mechanism design with ex-
changeable allocations. Now let us consider an illustrative
example on facility locations games.
Facility location games. In a facility location game, the lo-
cation of a facility is to be determined based on the prefer-
ences reported by selfish agents. It is often to assume that
agents have certain preference structures. For example, agents
have single-peaked preferences if they prefer to stay close
to the facility [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009], agents have
obnoxious preferences if they prefer to be far away from the
facility [Cheng et al., 2011], or agents have double-peaked
preferences if they prefer to stay at particular distance away
from the facility [Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2015]. In those stud-
ies, the private information of agents are their locations,
which may be easily verified by the central authority. Now
we assume that the locations of agents are the public infor-
mation but mechanisms do not know the preference structures
of agents. We consider two different types of preferences as
follows.
• ‘Like’ preference (or single-peaked preference): agents
would like to minimize their distances to the facility. We
denote this preference by L.
• ‘Dislike’ preference (or obnoxious preference): agents
would like to maximize their distances away from the
facility. We denote this preference by H .
Now let us illustrate the mechanism design with exchange-
able allocations by the instance in Figure 1, where five agents
are located in a line segment of a length of 8 km. The loca-
tions of agents are public information. Agents are asked to
report their preferences, like (L) or dislike (H). Figure 1a
shows the distances between agents and their true prefer-
ences. In this case, if we follow the approach of mechanism
design without payments, then it is easy to verify that locating
the facility that optimizes social welfare is a truthful mecha-
nism. That is, there is no incentive for agents to misreport
their preferences regardless the preferences reported by other
agents. Thus, the facility will be located at 5km (the loca-
tion of agent 3) in this instance. As we mentioned before,
after the facility being built, selfish agents could trade their
houses. We consider that the classical top trading cycle (TTC)
algorithm [Shapley and Scarf, 1974] is used here. Therefore,
agent 4 could trade her location with agent 1, which results
in that agent 4 is 5km away from the facility. Now, consider
the same instance except that agent 4 misreports her prefer-
ence, shown as in Figure 1b. To maximize the social welfare,
the facility is built at 7km (the location of agent 4). Yet, once
built, agent 4 could trade her location with agent 1 so that she
is 7km away from the facility. It provides her a better out-
come than in Figure 1a when she reported truthfully. Readers
may notice that this situation would not happen if all agents
have the same preference, L or H . However, as mechanism
designers, we are interested in dealing with the case when
selfish agents have different preferences or even conflicted
preferences. To summarize, using facility location games, we
demonstrate a problem in the approach of mechanism design
without payments. The insight is that mechanism designers
or social planners should consider what will happen after the
outcomes or allocations are chosen by mechanisms. Here we
consider that agents are able to exchange their allocations for
their mutual benefit.
0 km 8 km
L
a1 1
H
a2 4
L
a3 2
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L
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(a) Agent a4 reports her preference “L” truthfully
L
a1 1
H
a2 4
L
a3 2
L
a4 1
L
a5
(b) Agent a4 misreports her preference as “H”
Figure 1: Example 1
Cooperative Games. Cooperative games study how agents
form a coalition and benefit together. The focus of mechanism
design with exchangeable allocations is not forming coali-
tion. For example, in the facility location game in Figure 1, it
is not necessary for agent 4 to have a consensus with agent 1
before her misreport. The assumption we made is that agents
are utility maximizers. Otherwise, agent 1 may prefer to ex-
change her location with other agents rather than agent 4.
Top Trading Cycle. In this paper, we use the top trading
cycle (TTC) algorithm [Shapley and Scarf, 1974] to simulate
the exchange phase. There are different exchange protocols
to trade individual good, e.g. deferred acceptance algorithm.
The reasons that we choose the TTC algorithm over other
choices are two-fold. First, the final outcome produced by the
TTC algorithm is a core outcome, i.e., there is no other out-
come in which all agents could be better off by exchanging
their locations in a different way. It also implies that no ex-
change is possible afterwards. Second, as we are interested in
truthful mechanisms, it is essential to have truthful exchange
protocols. It is well-known that it is never advantageous to an
agent to lie about its preference in the TTC algorithm.
Our approaches and results.
We investigate mechanism design without payments when
agents are able to exchange their allocations. We first for-
malize the problem as mechanism design with exchangeable
allocations. Then, we study it in facility location games. The
first natural approach is to take exchanging phase into account
when we design truthful mechanisms. In other words, we are
interested in mechanisms that could exchange the locations of
agents on their behalf. We call it central exchanges model. In
this model, a mechanism is truthful if no agent could benefit
by misreporting her preference and then exchanging her allo-
cation with other agents. The first observation is that the de-
sign of such mechanism will highly depend on the exchange
procedure. In this paper, we assume that the TTC algorithm is
used in exchange phases. In addition, we consider a different
benchmark. As agents may exchange their locations, better
benchmarks would be the optimal social outcomes when one
is able to relocate agents. In central exchanges model, we give
a truthful mechanism that achieves the optimal social welfare.
Second, we understand that it is a strong assumption to al-
lows mechanisms to relocate agents. In Section 4, we investi-
gated the case that mechanisms only determine the location of
the facility and the exchanges are carried out by agents them-
selves. We call it individual exchanges model. We provide
a simple universally truthful randomized mechanism, which
guarantees that, after agents exchanging their locations, the
social welfare it achieves is at least half of the social welfare
achieved by any mechanism. Note that we do not require that
agents exchanges their locations according to the TTC algo-
rithm in individual exchanges model. We only assume that
agents are utility maximizers and exchange for their mutual
benefit.
Related Work
Mechanism design without payments was coined
in [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009] to study mechanism
design problems where the goal is to optimize an objective
under the restriction that no money transfer is possible. The
problem considered in [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009]
is a facility location game where selfish agents with single-
peaked preferences located on a line segment would like
to minimize their distances to the facility. They provided
different deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms
for minimizing the total distance of agents or minimizing the
maximum distance among agents. Later there is a significant
amount of work on facility location games with single-
peaked preferences in literature both from social choice
and computer science, e.g. [Schummer and Vohra, 2002;
Lu et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2010; Fotakis and Tzamos, 2010;
Fotakis and Tzamos, 2014; Serafino and Ventre, 2015].
Besides single-peaked preferences, facility locations
games are also investigated under other preferences. For ex-
ample, [Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2015] studied the case where
agents have double-peaked preferences, in which agents
would like to stay neither too close or too far away from the
facility. [Zou and Li, 2015] studied facility location games
with dual preference where agents are either willing to stay
close to or willing to stay away from the facility.
To the best of our knowledge, all existing work on facility
location games deal with the case that the locations of agents
are private information, i.e., the true locations of agents are
only known to themselves. The primary reason is that most
papers assume the preferences of agents and their prefer-
ences is unique. Arguably, the locations of agents are rela-
tively easy to verify by central authority. Thus, in this paper
we assume that there are two types of preference. However,
the exact types of preferences are agents’ private information.
It is the first paper to study mechanism design on facility lo-
cation games with different preferences when preferences are
unknown to mechanism.
2 Mechanism Design with Exchangeable
Allocations
In this section, we present the general description on mech-
anism design with exchangeable allocations, which consists
of two phases. The first phase is similar to mechanism de-
sign without payments in [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009].
There is a central authority who aims to optimize an public
known objective F by choosing an outcome from a set of all
possible outcomes denoted by O. To achieve good outcomes,
the authority implements a mechanism, say M, which first
asks a set of selfish agents, denoted by A, to declare their pri-
vate information and then chooses an outcome. In addition,
each agent i ∈ A has an utility function ui(·) for all possible
outcomes. Let ci denote the private information of agent i and
di be the private information declared by the agent i. Given
d =< d1, . . . , dn >, Mechanism M chooses an outcome
denoted by M(d). It is possible that agents would receive
different outcomes, for example, agents would receive dif-
ferent resource in resource allocation problems. To allow the
generality, we use Mi(d) to denote the outcome for agent i.
Hence, the utility of agent i is ui(Mi(d)).1
The second phase involves an (possibly pre-defined) ex-
change procedure E . Agents improve their utilities by ex-
changing their outcomes via procedure E . For example, agent
i may exchange her outcome with agent j if both agent i and
j improve their utility. That is,
ui(Mj(d)) > ui(Mi(d)) and uj(Mi(d)) > uj(Mj(d))
Note that the exchange procedure is not fixed and can be
specified due to different purposes. For example, as we men-
tioned, in this paper, we are mainly interested in the top trad-
ing circle as the exchange procedure. Let Ei(M(d)) be the
outcome of agent i after the exchanges. Hence, in the end
agent i has an utility ui(Ei(M(d))).
The goal of mechanism design with exchangeable alloca-
tions is to design mechanism that give agents incentive to de-
clare their true private information regardless the information
declared by others. Specifically , a mechanism M is truthful
if it holds that
ui(Ei(M(d−i, ci)) ≥ ui(Ei(M(d−i, di))
1We assume there is no externalities.
for any i,d−i and ci where d−i =<
d1, . . . , di−1, di+1, . . . , dn >.
In the rest of paper, we use facility location games
to demonstrate two different approaches to design truthful
mechanism.
3 Central Exchanges
In this section, we will focus on the central exchanges ap-
proach in facility location games, where mechanisms could
assign new locations to agents after the location of facility
has been decided. As we are interested in mechanisms that
maximize social welfare, it implies that agents will have no
incentives (or will not want) to exchange location themselves
given their new locations.
Model
In a facility location game, a facility is to built in a line seg-
ment [0, d], where n agents are located. Agent i is at point xi
that is known to the public, and has a private preference (aka,
type), Like (L) or Dislike (H), denoted by ti. We will call the
collection x =< x1, . . . , xn > a location profile, and the col-
lection t =< t1, . . . , tn > a preference profile. Furthermore,
we say xˆ is permuted to x if there exists a permutation pi such
that for any i ∈ [1, n] it holds xˆi = xpi(i).
A deterministic mechanism is a function M : R2n 7→
R
n+1 mapping a location profile x and a preference profile
t to a permuted location profile and a point in R which is the
location of the facility. For the purpose of easy presentation,
we sometimes denote the location of the facility byMf (x, t)
and the permuted location profile by M(x, t). We also de-
note the location assigned to agent i by Mi(x, t). Intuitively
speaking, a mechanism builds the facility at point Mf (x, t)
and relocates agent i to locationMi(x, t). Given the location
xˆi assigned to agent i and the location y ∈ R of the facility,
the utility of agent i is
u(y, xˆi, ti) =
{
d− |xˆi − y| if ti = L
|xˆi − y| if ti = H
Given a permuted location profile xˆ and a location of the
facility y ∈ R, the social welfare is
SW(y, xˆ, t) =
∑
i∈[1,n]
u(y, xˆi, ti)
A deterministic mechanism is truthful if no agent would
benefit by misreporting her preference regardless the lo-
cations and preferences declared by other agents. That
is, for every possible location profile x, every possible
preference profile t, every agent i ∈ [1, n] and every
t′i ∈ {L,H}, it holds that u(Mf(x, t),Mi(x, t), ti) ≥
u(Mf (x, < t−i, t
′
i >),Mi(x, < t−i, t
′
i >), t
′
i), where
t−i =< t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn >.
We are interested in truthful mechanisms that perform well
with respect to the optimal social welfare. The performance
ratio r of a mechanism is given by comparing the social wel-
fare it achieves with the optimal social welfare on any loca-
tion profile x and any preference profile t as follows.
r = max
y,x,xˆ,t
SW(y, xˆ, t)
SW(Mf (x, t),M(x, t), t)
where xˆ is permuted to x.
Optimal Mechanism
We first present a customized location permutation (see Al-
gorithm 1), which returns a location profile that is permuted
to xˆ given location profiles x and xˆ, a preference profile t and
a facility location y.
Algorithm 1: LocationPermuation(x, xˆ, t, y)
1 Let L and H denote the set of agents whose preferences
are L and H , respectively;
2 Let xˆL and xˆH denote the locations of agents in L and
H in xˆ, respectively;
3 Sort agents in L by their distances to y in x in an
increasing order. Similarly, sort agents in H by their
distances to y in x in a decreasing order;
4 Sort locations in xˆL by the distances to y in an
increasing order. Similarly, sort locations in xˆH by the
distances to y in a decreasing order;
5 Assign agents in L sequentially to locations in xˆL based
on their orders, and similarly assign agents in H
sequentially to locations in xˆH;
6 Return the assignment.
Essentially, Algorithm 1 assigns the locations xˆL(or xˆH) to
agents in L(or H) according to their distances to the facility in
location profile x. Now, we present the following mechanism:
Mechanism OPT . Given a location profile x and a prefer-
ence profile t, choose a permuted locations z and y such that
SW(y, z, t) is maximized, tie-breaking arbitrarily. The mech-
anism returns y as the location of the facility OPT f (x, t),
and call LocationPermuation(x, z, t, y) to compute the lo-
cations for agents OPT (x, t).
Note that z and y may not be unique. We assume that
MechanismOPT uses an arbitrary tie-breaking rule. The tie-
breaking rule has no effect on the performance of the mech-
anism as it always maximizes the social welfare. As we will
show that, if agents could benefit by lying their preferences in
Mechanism OPT , then the social welfare is not maximized.
Therefore, any arbitrary tie-breaking rule works for the truth-
fulness.
Examples of Algorithm 1. Now we would like to illustrate
Mechanism OPT using the instance in Figure 1. Readers
could verify that SW(y, z, t) is maximized when y = 8 and
z = {z1 = 5, z2 = 1, z3 = 8, z4 = 0, z5 = 7}. Mecha-
nism OPT locates the facility at 8. Now let us see the loca-
tions assigned to agents. As agent 5 is close to the location of
facility among agents with preference L, Mechanism OPT
assigns agent 5 to location 8. As agent 3 is the second closest
to the location of facility after agent 5, Mechanism OPT as-
signs agent 3 to location 7. Next, Mechanism OPT assigns
agent 1 to location 5. Similarly, for agents with preferenceH ,
Mechanism OPT assigns agent 4 to location 1 and agent 2
to location 0.
Computing z inOPT . MechanismOPT first chooses the
location of the facility y and a location profile z that is per-
muted to x such that the social welfare is maximized. In the
following we show that it is computationally feasible to find
a y and z given x and t.
Lemma 1. Given x, t, y and z that is permuted to x, if
SW(y, z, t) is maximized, then for any i ∈ H, zi ≤ min zL
or zi ≥ max zL.
Intuitively, Lemma 1 implies that agents whose preferences
are L are assigned to consecutive locations where social wel-
fare is maximized. This characterization strictly reduces the
space of the optimal outcomes. Next we present another char-
acterization on the locations of the facility in the optimal out-
comes.
Lemma 2. Given x, t and z that is permuted to x, there exists
a y such that y ∈ x ∪ {0, d} and SW(y, z, t) is maximized.
By Lemma 1 and 2, we limit the search space for the opti-
mal outcomes to O(n2). The optimal outcomes can be found
by enumerating all possible outcomes and returning the out-
come with the maximum social welfare. If ties exist, Mecha-
nism OPT breaks ties arbitrarily.
Lemma 3. Mechanism OPT is truthful.
Proof. We show that, given any x, t, any agent i ∈ H cannot
increase her utility by declaring ti = L. The proof for the
opposite case that any agent i ∈ L cannot increase her utility
by declaring ti = H is symmetric and omitted due to the
space limit.
H
. . .
H
zi
. . .
H L
. . .
L
y =Mf1 (x, t)
. . .
L H
. . .
(a) The outcome when agent ai reports her preference “H” truth-
fully in M1
H
. . .
H
z¯i
. . .
H L
. . .
L
y¯
. . .
L H
. . .
(b) A possible outcome when agent ai reports her preference as L
. . .
H L
. . .
L
z′i
. . .
L
y′ =Mf1(x, t)
. . . . . . . . .
L
. . .
H
. . .
(c) The outcome the maximize social welfare when agent ai misre-
ports her preference as L in M1
. . .
H L
. . .
L
. . .
L
y¯′
. . . . . . . . .
L
z¯′i
. . .
H
. . .
(d) The outcome after agent ai misreporting and exchanging his loca-
tion with other agent
Figure 2: Instances in the proof of Lemma 3
Before presenting the proof, we introduce the following
four instances that will be used in this proof. The instances
are shown in Figure 2,
• Instance a: x and t. Outcome:< y, z >. In this instance,
agents report preference truthfully.M1 places the facil-
ity at y and reassigns each agent j ∈ A to zj . The social
welfare is maximized.
• Instance b: x¯ and t¯ where x¯ = x and t¯ = t except
t¯i = L. Outcome: < y¯, ¯z > where y¯ = y and z¯ = z.
In this instance, agent i misreports her preference. The
facility is placed at y¯ and agent j ∈ A is assigned to z¯j .
• Instance c: x′ and t′ where x′ = x¯ and t′ = t¯. Outcome:
< y′, z′ >. In this instance, Mechanism OPT places
the facility at y′ and assigns each agent j ∈ A to z′j . The
social welfare is maximized.
• Instance d: x¯′ and t¯′ where x¯′ = x and t¯′ = t. Out-
come: < y¯′, z¯′ >. This instance is essentially the ex-
change phase, where agent i exchanges his location in
z
′ with agent j who is furthest to y′ with preferenceL in
z
′
.
From these instances , we get the following:∑
j∈H\{i}
u(y¯, z¯j , t¯i) +
∑
j∈L\{i}
u(y¯, z¯j , t¯i) + u(y¯, z¯i, L)
≤
∑
j∈H\{i}
u(y′, z′j, t
′
i) +
∑
j∈L\{i}
u(y′, z′j, t
′
i) + u(y
′, z′i, L)
=
∑
j∈H\{i}
u(y¯′, z¯′j, t¯
′
i) +
∑
j∈L\{i}
u(y¯′, z¯′j, t¯
′
i) + u(y¯
′, z¯′i, L)
(1)
The first inequality comes from that y′ and z′ maximizes
the social welfare when there are |L| + 1 agents with pref-
erence L. 2 Now let us assume that agent i could benefit by
misreporting her preference as L and then exchanging her lo-
cation with other agent. As u(y¯, z¯i, H) = u(y, zi, H) by def-
inition, it implies that u(y¯′, z¯′i, H) > u(y¯, z¯i, H). Since the
relation of two types of preferences are opposite, we know
that that u(y¯′, z¯′i, L) < u(y¯, z¯i, L). Substitute it into Equa-
tion (1), we get∑
j∈H\{i}
u(y¯, z¯j , t¯i) +
∑
j∈L\{i}
u(y¯, z¯j, t¯i)
<
∑
j∈H\{i}
u(y¯′, z¯′j , t¯
′
i) +
∑
j∈L\{i}
u(y¯′, z¯′j , t¯
′
i) (2)
Hence, we have∑
j∈H\{i}
u(y, zj, ti) +
∑
j∈L\{i}
u(y, zj, ti) + u(y, zi, H)
=
∑
j∈H\{i}
u(y¯, z¯j, t¯i) +
∑
j∈L\{i}
u(y¯, z¯j, t¯i) + u(y¯, z¯i, H)
<
∑
j∈H\{i}
u(y¯′, z¯′j , t¯
′
i) +
∑
j∈L\{i}
u(y¯′, z¯′j , t¯
′
i) + u(y¯
′, z¯′i, H)
It contradicts the fact that Mechanism OPT maximizes the
social welfare.
2In instances b and c the preference of agent i is L
4 Individual Exchanges
In this section, we explore the truthful mechanisms when so-
cial planners are less powerful. In particular, exchanges be-
tween agents are coordinated by agents themselves rather
than mechanisms. We assume that the TTC algorithm sim-
ulates the exchanges between agents. The problem is formal-
ized as follows.
Model
The goal is to locate a facility in a line segment [0, d] given a
location profile x and a preference profile t, which are defined
as previous section.
A deterministic mechanism is a function M : R2n → R
which is the location of the facility. A randomized mecha-
nism is a function M : R2n → ∆(R) where ∆(R) is the
set of distribution over R. Given any location profile x and
preference profile t, let M(x, t) denote the location of fa-
cility in mechanism M. M(x, t) is a random variable in a
randomized mechanism.
Given the location of the facility y, the location profile x
and the preference profile t, let T T C(x, t, y) denote the out-
come of the TTC algorithm. In particular, let T T Ci(x, t, y)
be the location of agent i from the TTC algorithm. Hence, the
utility of agent i is
u(y, T T Ci(x, t, y), ti) =
{
d− |T T Ci(x, t, y)− y| if ti = L
|T T Ci(x, t, y)− y| if ti = H
Similarly, the social welfare obtained by TTC is
SW(y, T T C(x, t, y), t) =
∑
i∈[1,n]
u(y, T T Ci(x, t, y), ti)
A deterministic mechanism M is truthful if no agent
would benefit by misreporting her preference in the mech-
anism and then obtaining a better outcome from the TTC
algorithm regardless of the locations and preferences of
other agents. That is, for any location profile x, any pref-
erence profile t, any i ∈ [1, n] and any t′i ∈ {L,H}, it
holds u(M(x, t), T T Ci(x, t,M(x, t)), ti) ≥ u(M(x, <
t−i, t
′
i >), T T Ci(x, < t−i, ti >,M(x, < t−i, t
′
i >)), ti).
Note that the preference t′i misreported by agent i only af-
fects the location of the facility chosen by mechanism M
only. Since the exchanges happened in the TTC algorithm
are carried out by agents themselves, the true preference ti
is used there. A universally truthful mechanism is a probabil-
ity distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms
As the previous section, we measure the performance of the
truthful mechanism with its approximation ratio to the opti-
mal social welfare. Given mechanism M, its approximation
ratio is defined as follows.
rM = max
y,x,xˆ,t
SW(y, xˆ, t)
SW(M(x, t), T T C(x,M(x, t), t), t)
where xˆ is permuted to x.
Optimal location
From the previous section, we know that, given the location
of the facility, agents with the same preference (L or H) will
be consecutive after their exchanges in the TTC algorithm.
Hence, it is easy to verify that, assuming agents report their
preference truthfully, one could locate the facility at the op-
timal location y so that the optimal social welfare will be
achieved after the exchanges between agents. Hence, the fol-
lowing question arises naturally: Is it a truthful mechanism
by locating the facility at the optimal location conditioned
on that agents would exchange their locations by TTC algo-
rithm? Note that in the example provided in Figure 1 the fa-
cility is located at the optimal location assuming that agents
would not exchange their locations.
Theorem 1. Given x and t, M(x, t) =
argmaxy∈[0,d] SW(y, xˆ, t) is not truthful given that
agents would exchange their locations by the TTC algorithm.
True preferences:
L
a1 1
L
a2 4
H
a3 1.5
H
a4 1.5
H
a5
Optimal location:
L
M(x, t)
L
4
H
1.5
H
1.5
H
(a) Agent a4 reports her preference “H” truthfully
Declared preferences:
L
a1 1
L
a2 4
H
a3 1.5
L
a4 1.5
H
a5
Optimal location:
H
1
H
4
L
1.5
L L
M(x, t)
(b) Agent a4 misreports her preference as “L”
Figure 3: Instances in Theorem 1
Proof. We prove this theorem by the instances shown in Fig-
ure 3 in which five agents are located in a line segment of a
length of 8km. Figure 3a shows the distance between agents
and their true preferences. The optimal location of the facility
is at 0km (the location of agent 1). No exchange would hap-
pen in the TTC algorithm as no pair of agents would prefer
exchanging the locations. The utility of agent 4 is 6.5. Now
considering the case that agent 4 falsely declares her prefer-
ence as L shown in Figure 3b, the optimal location of the fa-
cility is at 8km. Then in the TTC algorithm, agent 5 would ex-
change her location with agent 1, and agent 4 would exchange
her location with agent 2. The utility of agent 4 is 7. This im-
plies that agent 4 benefit by manipulating her preference in
the mechanism. Then the theorem directly follows.
Simple 2-approximation Mechanism
Next we provide a simple universally truthful randomized
mechanism that achieve at least half of the optimal social wel-
fare in expectation.
Mechanism M. Given a location profile x and a prefer-
ence profile t, Mf (x, t) = 0 with probability 1/2, and
Mf (x, t) = d with probability 1/2.
Theorem 2. MechanismM is a universally truthful random-
ized mechanism that achieves 2-approximation to the optimal
social welfare.
Universally truthfulness
It is easy to verify that agents would not benefit from misre-
porting their preference as Mechanism M always places the
facility at location 0 with a probability of 1/2 and places the
facility at location d with a probability of 1/2.
Approximation
The proof of the approximation of Mechanism M comes
from two ingredients.
Lemma 4. During exchanging phases, the social welfare in-
creases as agents exchange their locations with each other.
This lemma allows us to only consider the social welfare
before agents exchanging their locations. In other word, if the
social welfare before exchanging phases is close to the opti-
mal social welfare, then the social welfare after exchanging
phases is still close to the optimal social welfare. With some
simple calculations, we get the following.
Lemma 5. Given a location profile x and a preference profile
t, SW(Mf (x, t),x, t) = n·d2 .
Proof. As Mechanism M is randomize mechanism, the ex-
pected social welfare it achieves can be written as follows.
SW(Mf (x, t),x, t)
=SW(E[Mf (x, t)],x, t)
=
1
2
SW(0,x, t) +
1
2
SW(d,x, t)
=
1
2
∑
i∈A
u(0, xi, ti) +
1
2
∑
i∈A
u(d, xi, ti)
By the fact that u(0, xi, ti) + u(d, xi, ti) = d for
any agent in A regardless xi and ti, it concludes that
SW(Mf (x, t),x, t) = n·d2 .
By the fact that SW(M(x, t), T T C(x,M(x, t), t), t) >
SW(M(x, t),x, t) and the utility of each agent is at most d,
the approximation of Mechanism M directly follows.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the mechanism design without pay-
ments when selfish agents have difference types of prefer-
ences. We identify a limitation of the classical approach, that
is, agents could benefit by exchanging their allocations ob-
tained from mechanisms. To cope with this issue, we present
a model called mechanism design with exchangeable allo-
cations. We consider two approaches for this model, central
exchanges and individual exchanges. By using facility loca-
tion games as an example, we provide a truthful mechanism
that achieves the optimal social welfare in central exchanges.
We also provide a universally truthful randomized mecha-
nism that achieves at least half of the optimal social welfare
in individual exchanges. It will be interesting to investigate
the problem in settings other than facility location games. We
leave it as future work.
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